the rise of suburban developments, the flow of cars on an expressway, and the glimmer of skylines it embodies democracy.
but more and more frequently deferred maintenance is revealed in the midst of predictable events like hurricanes or heat waves. Deferred maintenance is a slow disaster taking place every day across the nation.
In what has now become a textbook example of this process, the failure of the New Orleans "levee and dewatering system" in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (2005) demonstrates the multiplier effect of deferred maintenance. A more recent example of climate change as a deferred maintenance mulitplier comes by way of Hurricane Sandy (2012) . In each case-despite very different environments, economic bases, and politics-we see clearly the ways that the bill of deferred maintenance comes due in the middle of a disaster.
The storm surge and wind effects of Hurricane Katrina were deadly and costly, but damage would have mostly likely been localized had it not been for the failure of the New Orleans levee system, resulting in the flooding of the Lower Ninth Ward, Gentilly, New Orleans East, Lakeview, St. Bernard Parish, and Plaquemines Parish. To date, the death toll of Hurricane Katrina stands at 1,836-though debate remains about that number.
It is important to recall that the Category 3 Hurricane Katrina that made landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2005 was in itself only the catalyst of the disaster we now lump into the overall disaster called simply "Katrina." In its postKatrina investigative report-A Failure of Initiative (Katrina Report)-a special federal commission found fault after fault with the New Orleans area protective levee system. The Katrina Report detailed the complexities of a protective infrastructure system designed and built by a federal entity but managed and maintained by a patchwork of local levee boards, municipal authorities, and state oversight authorities. The design and construction was carried out by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, and was built according to what is known as a "standard project hurricane," in this case one of a magnitude only expected once every 200-300 years.
The "standard project hurricane" is an imperfect tool-it's primary value being in its generalizable characteristics. It was not a surprise to the Corps of Orleans failed due to being eroded from underneath, in addition to some overtopping. From a design perspective it was a failure of a known weakness combined with the impact of a previously unimagined one.
Design failures were just the beginning. Or perhaps it's more accurate to say that the design failures were exacerbated by deferred maintenance-a deferral resulting from the unique governance system of the New Orleans area levee system. The Katrina Report summarizes the difficulty as one in which:
"different local organizations involved had the effect of diffusing responsibility and creating potential weaknesses. For example, levee breaches and distress were repeatedly noted at transition sections, where different organizations were responsible for different pieces . . . The different organizations also have different agendas, and sometimes these can thwart efforts to improve the safety of the overall system." 2 This uniquely American approach to decentralized governance meant that once the system was built, its retrofits and maintenance were left to locals who may not have had the funds or the technique necessary to get the job done.
In effect, Katrina exposed not only technological weakness, but also deferred maintenance, and in doing so it also exposed a deadly combination of technological and governmental missteps. In addition to the staggering death toll of Katrina, the storm topped $150 billion in direct costs and bankrupted the previously solvent National Flood Insurance Program. Over ten years out economists disagree on the long-term impact of the storm on the local economy.
Federal relief programs and investments in reconstruction brought local employment rates above the national average for years after the disaster.
However, such calculations do not take into account long-term environmental impacts of the storm-and the numbers are necessarily skewed towards looking at a population that could remain and rebuild. Those that left are not part of these calculations. The "slow disaster" of Katrina continues today, with almost 100,000 citizens-members of a Katrina diaspora-never returning to their city.
Unlike Hurricane Katrina, which exposed the vulnerability of a city due to a 
